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The Impact of Autocratic Regimes on Quality of Government

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While institutional quality has become a mantra for development professionals, its political determinants remain open to debate. So far, most studies on the nexus between regime type and quality of government have treated autocracies as a coherent group of countries. However, it is evident that regime characteristics vary a great deal not only between democracies and autocracies, but also among autocratic countries. Some autocracies have been able to build effective institutions, whereas others lag well behind the world average. This study provides an institutionalist perspective to differences in quality of government in autocracies and argues that certain autocratic regime types create more quality of government than others. Specifically, the empirical findings of our time-series cross-sectional analysis, based on a sample of 90 autocratic countries over a period of time from 1995 to 2014, suggest that monarchic autocracies generate more and military autocracies generate less quality of government than multiparty autocracies.

INTRODUCTION

Since the emergence of New Institutional Economics, state institutions have been brought back into the middle of the development discourse. While the idea that institutions are crucial for development is acknowledged by the majority of actors both in academia and in policy-making, the political determinants of institutional quality remain open to question, especially in autocracies. Are there some autocratic regime types that produce more quality of government than others and what are these political settings that are beneficial for the creation of quality of government in autocracies? This article aims to provide an answer to these questions and examines how different regime types affect government performance through an institutionalist approach to quality of government.

The main objective of this study is to shed light on the institutional determinants of quality of government in autocratic states. Our research proceeds as follows: First, we present existing literature on the topic and provide an insight to relevant theoretical arguments. Second, we present the data and the methodology of the empirical part of our research. Finally, before the conclusions, we present the results of our study and provide a brief discussion on the results vis-à-vis the objective of the study at hand.

HOW DO AUTOCRATIC REGIME TYPES AFFECT QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT?

In theories on autocracies, two institutional attributes seem to gain more prominence than others in influencing quality of government: time horizons and institutional constraints. Olson's theory on autocracies explains well the argument for time horizons. The longer the time horizons of a ruler are, the stronger is the regime's interest to produce public goods and the more stable the society becomes (Olson 1993). If a regime has no long term plans for the society, it will act like Olson's *roving bandit*,

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and thus, without any interest to provide public goods nor to generate stability (1993). Instead, as regards to institutional constraints (institutionalized restrictions on executive authority), the conventional assumption is that limiting the predatory nature of autocrats is of general interest. Constraining state autonomy can push the state to act for the common good (Przeworski and Limongi 1993) and constraints can increase bureaucratic efficiency (Gehlback and Keefer 2011). Thus, long time horizons and high institutional constraints should increase quality of government.

Often, it is argued that monarchic autocracies have longer time horizons than other autocratic regime types. Olson stresses that even if the son of the monarch is most probably not the most capable person for being the ruler, dynastic succession can be desirable in autocratic regimes, because it might reduce uncertainty related to the choice of the next ruler and might increase the ruler's long term interests (1993). The importance of hereditary succession to stability is advocated also by Brownlee, who suggests that even if hereditary succession inherently excludes new chief executives from outside the ruling family, when there are no institutionalized mechanisms for choosing a leader through the ruling party, the elites may prefer to maintain their status instead of taking the risk of a political struggle which could result in something much more exclusive (2007). Indeed, already in Napoleonic France hereditary monarchy was perceived to bring government stability. As argued by Dwyer, the transition from republic to the First French Empire and the return to a hereditary monarchic regime, was backed up by the elites and ordinary people who were convinced that such an institutional setting would provide the best means for solid institutional bases (2010). Therefore, long time horizons and stability seem to be endogenous characteristics of autocratic monarchies. Institutional constraints tend to be low in monarchies, which are regime types that are not constrained by other political institutions, but only by family networks (Gandhi 2008).

What does existing literature on autocratic regime characteristics suggest about the linkage between military regimes and quality of government? According to Gandhi and Przeworski, in military regimes the decision-making power lies usually within the military junta (2006). Moreover, military regimes are strong institutions by nature, and thus, they do not need to build constraining political institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Thus, like monarchs, military rulers tend to have low institutional constraints. However, military regimes seem to be less stable than monarchies. As explained by Huntington, "military juntas may exercise power, but they know that they will not have to be responsible for the consequences of their action, for they can always turn authority back to the civilians when the problems of governance become too much for them" (1968: 228). Therefore, military officers are less attached to political power than elites in other regimes. In similar vein, Geddes argues that military regimes are more vulnerable to internal breakdowns than other dictatorial regimes: in military regimes, leaders tend to value more the unity of the military organization itself than holding power in governmental offices (Geddes 1999). Instead of cooperating with rival factions for the power of the regime, most military officers have the option of retaining their position in the military organization and return to the barracks (Geddes 1999). Thus, military regimes seem to be characterized by short time horizons. These short time horizons are exacerbated by problems related to the legitimacy of the military rule. While the more enduring monarchies can always claim their authority on the basis of historical and divine rights, military regimes gain power inherently for short-term periods. As Kailitz and Stockemer point out, military regimes lose rapidly their legitimacy: whether the military regime does not solve the crisis that led to the military coup or it successfully solves the crisis, it loses its legitimacy (2017). While in monarchies rulers have more incentives to facilitate their successors' life, they might have more incentives to create quality of government. Instead, military autocrats value more their own military organizations, and thus, have less incentives to facilitate their successors' leadership.

The number of autocracies with parties, elections and legislatures has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War. According to Gandhi, parties are instruments that stimulate cooperation between the regime and outsiders, mobilize individuals that want to collaborate with the

regime and control potential opposition groups (2008). Therefore, parties might increase the time horizons of the regime and generate quality of government. Often, nominally democratic institutions survive even after the ruler changes, and as a consequence, resources are allocated less for clientelist purposes and more for the well-being of the whole society (Gandhi 2008). Similarly, Gehlback and Keefer argue that ruling-party institutionalization creates bureaucratic performance, because it increases the credibility of the regime and incentives bureaucrats to provide high effort (2011). Then again, Levitsky and Way argue that “the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods aimed at keeping incumbents in power creates an inherent source of instability” (2002: 59). At this point, it is important to make a distinction between one-party regimes and multiparty regimes. The former ones (e.g. China, N. Korea, Cuba) should be less fragile than the latter ones (e.g. Russia, Malaysia, Haiti), because we can expect the tension between democratic rules and autocratic methods to be stronger in multiparty regimes than in one-party regimes. Fjelde argues that the institutional infrastructure of one-party regimes is a powerful tool to systematically control the society and suppress the opposition (2010). Instead, the institutional setting of multiparty regimes does not allow a full control of the opposition, which has more options to challenge the dominant party than in one-party regimes (Fjelde 2010). Thus, while we might expect one-party regimes to have longer time horizons than multiparty regimes, multiparty regimes seem to have more institutional constraints than one-party regimes. Knutsen, Nygård and Wig analyse the consequences of autocratic elections and suggest that the short term effect of elections on regime stability is negative while the long term effect is positive (2017). If successful elections are to be organized, a certain amount of administrative capacity must be created (Knutsen, Nygård and Wig 2017). Hence, elections seem to have both positive and negative effects on quality of government.

As we have seen, theory suggests that autocratic regime types can be distinguished by different institutional attributes and characteristics. In turn, quality of government might vary as a consequence of these differences. Hadenius and Teorell analyse regime type characteristics in autocratic countries and find empirically that monarchies are the most stable type of regime, whereas military regimes and multiparty autocracies are the most fragile types of regime (2007). To our knowledge, the only empirical research on the effect of autocratic institutions on quality of government is made by Charron and Lapuente, who analyze the issue by means of a sample of over 70 countries from 1983 to 2003 (2011). The authors argue that in single-party regimes quality of government is produced by a combination between demand and supply factors, while in other autocratic regime types government quality is generated only by supply-side factors (Charron and Lapuente 2011). Their results point out that an interaction between regime type and economic development is beneficial for quality of government in single-party regimes (Charron and Lapuente 2011). However, they do not find strong empirical support for their theory according to which the effect of monarchic and military regimes on quality of government is conditional on the rulers’ time horizons (2011). Knutsen and Fjelde examine empirically the effect of autocratic regime types on property rights protection and find that monarchies protect property rights more than any other autocratic regime type (2013). They associate time horizons and institutional constraints to different regime types and their ability to protect property rights. However, they do not examine specifically the relationship between autocratic regimes and quality of government, even if they discover that bureaucratic quality has a positive effect on property rights protection (Knutsen and Fjelde 2013).

Based on the discussed considerations, we expect monarchies to have the highest quality of government. Monarchic autocracies are characterized by long time horizons and there is limited uncertainty about the future. Hereditary succession, an inherent characteristic of monarchic autocracies, curbs the possibility of succession crises. While in monarchies institutional constraints are low, the hereditary character gives the monarchs incentives to produce high government quality. In military autocracies the future is inevitably uncertain and the planning horizons of the regime are inherently short. Military regimes are more fragile than other regimes, because they lose their

legitimacy sooner or later. The incentives to create high quality of government are low, because the military institution is essentially a temporary regime type. Moreover, we can assume institutional constraints to be low. Therefore, we expect military regimes to be linked with low quality of government. The effect of multiparty and one-party regimes on quality of government is harder to predict. On the one hand, we might assume that one-party regimes produce higher quality of government than multiparty regimes, because in multiparty regimes the instability produced by a certain extent of political competition and the existence of an organized opposition produces political instability and might shorten time horizons. On the other hand, institutional constraints seem to be higher in multiparty than one-party regimes, in which rulers have a stronger control on the society and more room to act for private interests.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Before presenting the data and the empirical methodology, it is important to clarify what we mean by quality of government in this research. We use the term *quality of government* instead of other closely related terms, because it does not have strong ideological connotations and because it is defined by Charron and Lapuente as “the ability of a state to perform its activities in an *efficient way* and *without corruption*” (2010: 443). We refer to quality of government to a large extent in such a Weberian form of public administration and are focused on its efficiency dimension.

Quality of government is the dependent variable of our research. It is measured by the *Government Effectiveness* index, which is one of the six World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and one of the most frequently used measures of governance in academic research. It is a composite index based on several separate data sources that tries to capture mainly the level of public services, bureaucratic quality and the quality of policy-making for each country (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). Thus, it is conceptually close to our definition of quality of government. Moreover, measuring governance with an aggregate index that is based on data from several sources is less sensitive to inaccuracies and measurement errors than single indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). Therefore, the Government Effectiveness index seems to be the most appropriate choice to measure quality of government for the study at hand. The WGI data is available bi-annually since 1996 and annually since 2002. The standard unit of our dependent variable ranges roughly from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher score indicates better quality of government.

When it comes to authoritarian regime types, our explanatory variables are categorical data on different authoritarian regime types taken from the updated Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius Authoritarian Regime Dataset (2013). This classification is chosen because of its clear conceptual definition of autocratic regime types and because it covers more recent years than the other frequently used classifications. Compared to other classifications, it gives “supremacy to the institutions underpinning the mode of governing” (Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013: 31). Four different autocratic regime types are taken into consideration in our study: *monarchies*, *military regimes*, *one-party regimes* and *multiparty regimes*. Autocratic monarchies are regimes in which “a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice or the constitution” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 146). In military regimes the armed forces are the principal political actors. Military officers can exercise their power either directly or indirectly through civilian leaders (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Both one-party and multiparty regimes are electoral regimes, and thus, hold popular elections for legislators or the executive (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). In one-party regimes only one party can participate in elections, while in multiparty regimes the opposition or independent candidates are allowed to take part in elections causing a certain amount of competition between the candidates or the parties (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Less frequent *no*

party regimes and *other* regimes that do not fit one of the major categories are excluded from the study at hand.

Now that we have defined our main variables, we must identify the factors that might influence the relationship between regime type and quality of government. Our independent variables are taken from the UN's World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2017), unless otherwise specified. Virtually all existing studies on the topic consider economic development as a feature that affects the regime type-quality of government nexus. It is plausible to imagine that a country with more economic resources has more possibilities to develop a successful bureaucracy. For example, Bäck and Hadenius (2008) show that economic prosperity has a positive and statistically significant effect on administrative capacity. Therefore, we add a control variable, namely the *logarithm of GDP per capita* in constant 2010 U.S. dollars, to control for the level of economic wealth in each country. Often the size of a country, either measured by its population or by its area, is negatively linked to quality of government. Stockemer argues that a large population creates difficulties in distributing services equally throughout the population (2014). According to Bartolini and Santolini, a large population is linked to deeper cultural and economic differences, and thus, might affect negatively quality of government (2017). An opposing argument is taken by Charron and Lapuente, who claim that a larger population is able to produce more resources than a smaller population, allowing more options to generate quality of government (2011). Thus, we add the *logarithm of total population* as a control variable to our analysis. One part of current literature argues that economic integration into the global markets might increase the quality of state institutions. Countries that are more integrated into the global economy should have higher levels of governance in order to be competitive and attract investments from abroad (Stockemer, 2014). Thus, a control variable for *international trade*, measured as the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP, is included in the analysis. Often, in political studies, it is argued that abundant natural resources are a curse because they are related negatively to growth and development. According to Gandhi and Przeworski, autocracies that can rely on mineral resource revenues need less cooperation than autocracies that cannot extract rents from mineral resources (2006). Charron and Lapuente suggest that autocracies that can rely more on natural resources produce less quality of government (2011). Blanco, Nugent and O'Connor find that oil abundance has a strong and negative impact on bureaucratic quality (2015). In selecting our measure, we follow the idea of Blanco, Nugent and O'Connor, who recommend using oil rents as a measure of oil abundance, instead of oil exports or oil production that have been criticized because of possible problems of endogeneity (2015). As many autocracies have considerable amounts of natural resources, we should analyse the nexus between regime type and quality of governance by controlling for *natural resource rents*, measured as the total natural resources rent as a percentage of GDP.

Besides controlling for economic development, population, international trade and natural resource abundance, we test for the effect of a few additional independent variables. Some researchers suggest that colonial heritage can play an important role for quality of government. Bäck and Hadenius find that former British colonialism has a positive effect on state capacity (2008). Therefore, we add a dummy variable (1 = former British colony, 0 = not former British colony) in order to control for the institutional differences that might be rooted in the colonial experiences that seem to depend on the former colonial ruler. The *British colony dummy* is taken from the aforementioned Authoritarian Regime Dataset. *Chief executive years in office*, a variable taken from the Inter-American Development Bank's Database of Political Institutions, is used to measure how many consecutive years the chief executive has been in office (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2016). The higher its value, the more years have passed since the last change in the chief executive. Przeworski et al. suggest that changes of chief executive might threaten the status quo and generate instability in autocracies (2000). Instead, Besley and Kudamatsu argue that leadership change has a positive impact on economic performance in autocracies, because it shows that poor leaders can be credibly

substituted (2008). On the one hand, many consecutive years in office of the chief executive seem to generate stability. On the other hand, many consecutive chief executive years in office might be a sign of unconstrained powers held by the regime. Thus, we control for the consecutive number of years in office of the chief executive. It is plausible to expect that armed conflicts generate political instability, destruction and hinder bureaucratic capacity. However, not all armed conflicts seem to have similar effects. Previous literature suggests that especially civil wars have a negative effect on government quality. Besley and Persson argue that compared to interstate wars, which increase state capacity, civil wars are necessarily related to conflicting interests within a country, and thus, have a detrimental effect on state capacity (2008). Similarly, Cárdenas finds that internal wars destroy quality of government (2010). Accordingly, we control for the magnitude of civil wars and expect a negative impact on quality of government. The variable *magnitude of civil wars* is taken from Center for Systemic Peace's Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset (Marshall 2017). Following Tavits, we add *time count dummies* in all our regression models. "The trend variable helps to avoid the problem of spurious correlation arising when the values of the dependent variable and those of one or more independent variables vary independently but in a consistent direction over time" (Tavits 2005: 290). It is likely that our dependent variable and some of our independent variables are characterized by such a trend. The time count dummies are constructed on the basis of calendar years that are grouped in four-year periods and are *time 1* (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002), *time 2* (2003-2006), *time 3* (2007-2010) and *time 4* (2011-2014). Additionally, we add area dummies in the last model. It is plausible that cultural, historical and geographic factors related to a certain area affect quality of government. We divide the sample of autocratic countries in five areas that are *Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union*, *Latin America and the Caribbean*, *Middle East and North Africa*, *Sub-Saharan Africa*, *Asia and Pacific*.

In order to test empirically the relationship between quality of government and regime type, we employ time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression models that take into consideration both temporal and cross-sectional variation. Our pooled dataset, in which the unit of analysis is the country-year, allows to take advantage of all the available observations over time and across countries. It is reasonable to think that our data might suffer from serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation, leading potentially to incorrect OLS estimates. As suggested by Drukker (2003), we employ a Wooldridge test to identify possible serial correlation in our models. The test confirms that our error terms are severely autocorrelated. A Breusch-Pagan (1979) and Cook-Weisberg (1983) test for heteroscedasticity is performed on our independent variables of the first regression model. The test detects heteroscedasticity in our error terms. Contemporaneous correlation of errors is plausible in a cross-national context (Beck and Katz 1995). Therefore, as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) for models in which panel-level heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation of the errors and serially correlated errors must be corrected, we employ a Prais-Winsten transformation correcting for first order common autocorrelation (AR 1) and OLS panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates. Our dataset is unbalanced mainly because it takes into account some countries that do not exist in all years of observations and some countries that have experienced democracy (or autocracy) transitions during our period of observations. Following Charron and Lapuente we lag all independent variables at $t-1$. This will not resolve completely possible problems of endogeneity, but at least it will assure that reverse causality is excluded by our models, because independent variables at $t-1$ cannot be affected by the dependent variable at t (Charron and Lapuente 2010).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

As we can see from fig. 1, quality of government is not homogeneously distributed in all autocratic regimes. The average level of quality of government changes substantially from one autocratic regime type to another. Monarchic autocracies seem to be more successful than other autocratic regimes in terms of quality of government. On an average, military autocracies have the poorest quality of government of all our regime categories. Instead, in multiparty and one-party autocracies quality of government is markedly lower than in monarchies, but not as poor as in military regimes. Compared to one-party regimes, on an average, multiparty regimes are more successful as regards to quality of government.




Fig. 1 – Quality of government in autocratic countries by regime type, average over time (years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002..2014). The average no. of countries per year (N) and the no. of total observations (n) in parentheses.

Table 1 shows the results of our TSCS regressions. First, in the baseline model, our hypotheses are tested controlling for measures that are frequently used in relevant empirical literature. In the second model, we test our hypotheses by adding controls for British colonial past, civil war and chief executive years in office. Finally, in the full model, we add also area dummies in order to check for the effect of region-specific impact on our dependent variable. In all models the reference category is multiparty. Model 1 shows that *ceteris paribus*, compared to multiparty regimes, monarchies have a positive and statistically significant effect on quality of government, military regimes have a negative and statistically significant effect on quality of government and one-party regimes have a negative but statistically non-significant effect on quality of government. Of all autocratic regime types, military regimes have the most negative impact on our dependent variable. Instead, monarchies regimes perform better than other regime types with regard to quality of government. The coefficient for monarchic regimes is significant at the 99.9% level, while the coefficient for military regimes is significant at the 99% level. Including the additional control variables in model 2 does not alter considerably the estimates of our main explanatory variables. Monarchies seem to lead to a higher quality of government than multiparty regimes. Again, the effect of monarchies is positive and statistically significant at the 99.9% level of confidence compared to multiparty regimes. As in model 1, the effect of military regimes on quality of government is negative and statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence in comparison with multiparty regimes. In model 2, multiparty regimes perform slightly better than one-party regimes in terms of government quality, but the coefficient for one-party regimes does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Model 3 includes additional controls for area-specific factors. The coefficient for monarchic regimes is lower than in the other models, but remains positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. Again, when compared to multiparty regimes, military regimes have a negative and statistically significant (at the 99% level) effect on quality of government. In model 3, the coefficient for one-party regimes becomes

more negative, but it does not reach statistical significance. Moreover, in model 3 there is no substantial difference between the coefficients for military and one-party regimes.

As regards to the other independent variables, in model 1 economic development, international trade and population exert a significant positive effect on quality of government. Instead, natural resource rents exert a negative and statistically significant effect on our dependent variable. In model 2 we add controls for British colonial heritage, civil war and consecutive chief executive years in office. The coefficients for the independent variables that were included already in model 1 do not change substantially. When it comes to our three additional control variables, British colonial heritage has a positive significant effect and civil war has a negative and statistically significant effect on quality of government. Instead, the coefficient for chief executive years in office is minimal and statistically non-significant in both models. In model 3 we add area dummies to control for region-specific factors. The coefficient for log (population) seems to be absorbed, at least to a certain extent, by the additional area controls and it loses its statistical significance. Adding the area controls weakens also the coefficients for British colony. Log (GDP per capita), trade and British colony have positive and statistically significant (at the 99.9% level) coefficients. Instead, natural resource rents and civil war reduce quality of government, with statistically significant coefficients at the 99.9% level. Again, chief executive years in office do not exert any significant effect on quality of government.

TABLE 1

THE EFFECT OF AUTOCRATIC REGIME TYPES ON QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT. DEP. VAR.: WGI GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS from 1996 to 2014 (1997, 1999, 2001 EXCL.). TSCS REGRESSION MODELS WITH PRAIS-WINSTEN CORRECTION FOR COMMON SERIAL CORRELATION (AR 1) AND OLS PCSE ESTIMATES.

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>	
	Baseline		Additional controls		Full model	
Multiparty (base) _{t-1}						
Monarchy _{t-1}	0.305***	(6.052)	0.251***	(4.124)	0.146*	(2.393)
Military _{t-1}	-0.097**	(-2.861)	-0.099**	(-2.899)	-0.107**	(-3.094)
One-party _{t-1}	-0.067	(-1.245)	-0.028	(-0.462)	-0.100	(-1.631)
Log (GDP p.c.) _{t-1}	0.274***	(18.145)	0.234***	(15.348)	0.233***	(12.543)
Log (pop.) _{t-1}	0.030**	(3.200)	0.055***	(4.957)	0.022	(1.697)
Internat. trade _{t-1}	0.002***	(5.654)	0.003***	(6.127)	0.002***	(4.844)
Nat. res. rents _{t-1}	-0.013***	(-6.469)	-0.012***	(-6.278)	-0.011***	(-6.209)
British colony			0.242***	(9.010)	0.127***	(5.246)
Civil war _{t-1}			-0.070***	(-6.034)	-0.085***	(-7.293)
Chief executive years in office _{t-1}			0.0004	(0.274)	0.001	(0.610)
Observations	1191		1124		1124	
Countries	90		85		85	
R ²	0.53		0.54		0.59	
Area dummies	No		No		Yes	

Notes: z-statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Constant coefficient measured, but not reported. Coefficients for area and year dummies not reported. Reference autocratic regime category in all models is *multiparty*. Omitted time count variable is *time 1* and omitted area variable is *Sub-Saharan Africa*.

To sum up the results, the coefficients for monarchy and military regimes are statistically significant in all the three models. Compared to multiparty regimes, monarchies have a positive impact and military regimes have a negative impact on quality of government. Instead, one-party regimes have consistently a negative, but statistically non-significant coefficient. As to the control variables, the higher is the level of economic development and international trade, the higher is quality of

government. The higher is the level of natural resource rents and civil war magnitude, the lower is quality of government. Former British colonies have higher levels of government quality. When regional factors are controlled for, population does not have a significant effect on quality of government. Chief executive years in office does not exert a significant impact on our dependent variable.

As suggested by our hypotheses, regime types do have an impact on quality of government in autocratic states. Different regime types seem to lead to substantially different levels of quality of government. As expected, quality of government is higher in monarchies. The theories about inherently long time horizons of monarchies seem to be correct. While monarchies might have low institutional constraints, the hereditary attributes might incentivize monarchs to create a capable bureaucracy, confirming the theories about the desirability of hereditary monarchies. Instead, military regimes seem to produce poor quality of government. As suggested by some theories, military regimes have inherently low time horizons and low stability. Military leaders and elites know, that sooner or later the military rule will come to an end. Military regimes are highly autonomous and the lack of institutional constraints does not allow to limit military rulers' predatory behaviour. Thus, military rulers might not have the need or the incentives to be concerned about quality of government. Our results indicate that multiparty regimes have better quality of government than military regimes, but worse than monarchic regimes. An explanation could be that multiparty autocracies' nominally democratic institutions produce mutually opposing effects on government quality. On one hand, in multiparty autocracies there are more regime constraints and more room for cooperation, which should favour the creation of government quality compared to both monarchies and military regimes. On the other hand, it has been argued that multiparty regimes are inherently unstable, because of political competition and the tension created by democratic institutions in autocratic settings. Thus, they have shorter time horizons and less incentives to create quality of government. While the differences between multiparty regimes, monarchic regimes and military regimes are significant in predicting quality of government, the difference between multiparty regimes and one-party regimes is not significant according to the data at hand. An explanation could be that multiparty and one-party regimes share in common something that the other regimes do not have: parties, elections and legislatures.

CONCLUSIONS

While the importance of quality of government to development has been widely recognized, there is less consensus on the institutional determinants of quality of government. So far, the majority of the studies have paid attention more to democracies than autocracies. This study contributes to existing literature by analysing how and why different regime types determine quality of government in autocratic countries around the world. Moreover, this study tries to shed light on the relationship between autocracies with nominally democratic institutions (multiparty and one-party) and quality of government. To our knowledge, existing empirical analyses on the topic do not distinguish between different regime types with parties, elections and legislatures, even if the number of these regimes has increased rapidly in the last decades. In our research we take a first step to fill this gap, but it is evident that our understanding about these regimes is still limited compared to other regime types. We find that autocracies vary a great deal in relation to their institutional attributes, which are in turn linked to substantially different levels of quality of government. Our empirical results suggest that compared to multiparty regimes, monarchies exert a positive effect on quality of government, whereas military regimes exert a negative effect on quality of government. Instead, while on an average multiparty regimes have higher quality of government than one-party regimes, we find no strong empirical evidence about a significant difference between multiparty and one-party regimes in

predicting quality of government. Future studies on governance in autocracies should be able to draw upon our empirical findings for further research on the topic.

Finally, we want to emphasize that our study has some limits and should be regarded as a preliminary study on the topic. Since there is no consensus about the definition of quality of government, quality of governance or similar concepts, nor there is consensus about an optimal classification of different regime types, the empirical findings of our research are sensitive to the chosen data. Due to space restrictions, the study at hand does not provide an exhaustive discussion on our data selection procedure. However, leaving aside other methodological issues, it is crucial to keep in mind that a careful and theoretically justified choice of adequate measures is of vital importance in any research concerning the relationship of such disputed concepts as governance and regime type.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 2
LIST OF COUNTRIES

Afghanistan	Egypt	Madagascar	Sierra Leone
Albania	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Singapore
Algeria	Eritrea	Malaysia	<i>Solomon Islands</i>
Angola	Ethiopia	Maldives	<i>Somalia</i>
Antigua and Barbuda	Fiji	<i>Mali</i>	Sri Lanka
Armenia	Gabon	Mauritania	Sudan
Azerbaijan	Gambia	<i>Mexico</i>	<i>Suriname</i>
Bahrain	Georgia	<i>Moldova</i>	Swaziland
Bangladesh	Guatemala	Morocco	<i>Syria</i>
Belarus	Guinea	Mozambique	Tajikistan
Bhutan	Guinea-Bissau	Myanmar	Tanzania
Bosnia and Herzegov.	Haiti	Nepal	Thailand
Brunei	Honduras	Nicaragua	Togo
Burkina Faso	Indonesia	Niger	Tonga
Burundi	Iraq	Nigeria	Tunisia
Cambodia	Ivory Coast	<i>North Korea</i>	Turkey
Cameroon	Jordan	Oman	Turkmenistan
Central African Rep.	Kazakhstan	Pakistan	Uganda
Chad	Kenya	<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	Ukraine
China	Kuwait	<i>Paraguay</i>	United Arab Emirates
Colombia	Kyrgyzstan	<i>Peru</i>	Uzbekistan
Comoros	Laos	Qatar	Venezuela
Congo Brazzaville	Lebanon	Russia	Vietnam
Congo Kinshasa	<i>Lesotho</i>	Rwanda	Yemen
<i>Croatia</i>	Liberia	Saudi Arabia	Zambia
Cuba	<i>Libya</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	Zimbabwe
Djibouti	<i>Macedonia</i>	Seychelles	

Notes: Countries in italics are not included in regression models due to missing data.