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**Mafia's entrenched model:
a case study in Rome**

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Mafia's entrenched model: a case study in Rome

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Abstract

In these past few years, public debate has depicted more and more, mafia-type organizations as liquid structures, being less linked to a specific territory and increasingly becoming more globalized. They are also presented as less focussed on traditional associated activities (i.e. public works, waste disposal, gaming, drug trafficking, extortions) and more interested in financial operations. So, if all those premises are real, might it still be important to study the relationship between mafias organization and the territory? Is it possible to reproduce a traditionally entrenched model also in an area of new expansion?

The aim of this paper is to analyse how mafia-type organizations are entrenched in a local context in a non-traditional area and if mafia model could still be an efficient one. After introducing the role that territory still have on establishing the mafias' identity and concept of power, the focus will be shifted to a specific case study, the Fascianis clan in the municipality of Ostia, in Rome.

This analysis has been conducted using documentary and judicial sources but also interviews with privileged witnesses and in-depth investigations based on direct observation.

INTRODUCTION: LOCAL ROOTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEBATE.

Today, traditional mafia-type organizations (Cosa nostra, 'ndrangheta and camorra) are obviously different phenomena from many points of views from those associations that arose respectively in Sicily, Calabria and in Naples during the Bourbons period.

“As every social phenomenon, also mafia isn't the same in every time and in every space” (Sciarrone 2014: 27) and radical changes have altered its structure (especially in the case of Cosa nostra) and investment areas, but some elements seem to continue to be important now as it did then.

The organized crime globalization and “the liquid mafias” are recurring topic in the recent debate (for a specific focus see Varese 2011). In the light of their expansion process and of the diversification of their investments, they would become a sort of crime corporations and a deep link with a local context seems to be not more necessary, in particular in the areas of new settlement.

In organized crime literature, the issue of relationship between mafia-type associations and territories has been discussed by the most important authors (dalla Chiesa, Santino, Sciarrone and Varese) and the territory is considered important from a strategical and symbolical perspective. It is a constitutive element of mafia model (dalla Chiesa 2010) and also the power of these organizations is defined “territorial” (Sciarrone 2002).

“We can consider mafia organizations both as an international and local phenomenon: they need social and political legitimation in a given territory, but running parallel they

seek to expand their affairs further” (Martone and Vesco 2017). So, they seem to be able to maintain at the same time strong local roots and globalized investments and they are at the same time linked to modernity and to the past (dalla Chiesa 2010).

But today, not only mafias but also the concept itself of territory has changed.

The mafias’ expansion in non-traditional areas has been a topic of growing interest in the last few years among organized crime studies and the most important authors agree that the mafia is a strictly local phenomenon (dalla Chiesa, Sciarrone, Santino, Varese). Some assume that Cosa nostra could even be as a reflection of the attitude of the Sicilian people (Capuana 1892; Pitre 1913, but to some extent the same reflexion could be found in Mosca’s definition of the “mafia’s spirit”, Mosca 1900). Others wrote that this transplantation is impossible, due to the fact that such organizations are too closely linked with their original territory, so that they are unable to succeed in a new one (Gambetta 1992; Reuter 1995).

Traditionally, the contexts were Sicilian and Calabrese agricultural areas and popular quarters in Naples. Small local communities, with strong identities and social homogeneity, which were easy to control. But since the early 1990s, some judicial inquiries and academic researches¹ demonstrate that Italian mafias succeeded in their expanding movements and nowadays are entrenched in the North and Centre of Italy (especially in Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, Emilia – Romagna and Lazio), in several European States (especially Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, Switzerland) and at last, but not least, in the USA, Australia, Canada. This evolutionary trend raises several and important theoretical questions and challenges the classic theory. Which elements of the mafia model are still valid in these – large, rich and developed - contexts? And what are the mafias’ characteristics that are being reproduced? Usually, the answer is that in those areas a traditional entrenchment is utterly impossible. In Sciarrone’s opinion it is impossible that mafias could reproduce such model and, eventually, they could be able to exercise a control only on delimited areas, where there is an historical criminal presence (Sciarrone 2014: 28). Dalla Chiesa, specify that such form of domain can be reproduced in small municipality (between 5.000 and 10.000 inhabitants), more similar to original contexts, as ‘ndrangheta does in the Northern Italy.

Some suggests that mafias would “take with them their moneys but not their methods” (on the persistence of this opinion see dalla Chiesa 2016), this thesis then suggests that outside Sicily, Calabria and Campania is possible just a sort of economic infiltration. In the light of this premises, is traditional mafia model still valid and efficient?

To answer to this question, it is necessary to introduce another evolutionary trend. At the same time of traditional mafias expansion process, another phenomenon took place in non-traditional regions and it is the adoption of mafia model by local criminal groups that haven’t or never had connections with classical organizations. Through a process called “imitation” (Sciarrone 1998) or “isomorphism” (La Spina 2015), these “local mafias” (the most popular are Sacra corona unita, Mala del Brenta and Basilischi) mimic some – but not all – the characteristics of the mafia model.

This issue has attracted still little attention in academic studies (La Spina 2015; Massari 1998; Sciarrone 1998; Sergi 2015). Massari (1998a) suggests that in urban contexts these types of criminal organizations tend to be less able to approach the institutions and have fewer resources, so they could be defined as more similar to gangster groups. In an urban context, also spatial mobility of inhabitants and large spaces could be an obstacle to traditional entrenchment (dalla Chiesa 2015).

¹ The most important authors could be considered Ciconte, dalla Chiesa, Massari, Santoro, Sciarrone, Varese, Trascrime and Cross for Northern Italy and Allum, Campana, Cross, Lupo, Sciarrone and Storti, Sergi, Varese, Trascrime for expansion in EU and USA.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the mafias' entrenched model on a territory in non-traditional areas. To do it, an interesting and still little explored perspective seems to be the local mafias one. So, how they are entrenched in their territory?

Usually, the definition of mafia is taken from the Italian Penal Code. Article 416 *bis*² and there isn't a common and shared definition of mafia in sociology instead (Santoro 2015)³. The object of this analysis is the organizations' point of view, so we consider mafia as "a specific form of power exercise, based on a specific and solid vision of social relationships" (dalla Chiesa 2016: 17, but see also dalla Chiesa 1976).

Mafia is obviously a challenging object to study, due to its own secret nature and its illegal activities and therefore it can never be completely known.

In order to conduct the case study, the analysis of the existing academic, journalistic and documentary sources has been integrated by an empirical analysis on the fieldwork, in particular through semi-structured interviews to privileged observers (a prosecutor, a judge, an investigator, a journalist, a local anti-mafia activist and a local politician) and participation to public events.

In the next paragraph, this topic will be faced with two ideal-types of the mafia relationship with territory, and in the last paragraph a specific case will be interrogated on that basis.

MAFIAS'S SETTLEMENT IN A TERRITORY: TWO ANTHITETICAL MODELS

Before discussing those questions, it is important to introduce a focus on what are the traditional model's characteristics. This issue is addressed by comparing two different ideal-types: the first could be called the ideal-type of "territorial sovereignty" (recalling the classical Santino's definition, see Chinnici and Santino 1991; Santino 1995). It is the traditional entrenched model, easier to find in the areas of origins. The second is the opposite, namely the ideal-type that we might call of "economic mafia". Those don't represent necessarily a concrete context, but are generalizations that could be useful to introduce a comparison⁴.

The mafias' traditional contexts are usually small villages (i.e. two of the most evocative are San Luca in Calabria or Corleone in Sicily) or cities neighbourhoods with precise borders and a strong identity (i.e. Palermo or Naples) (dalla Chiesa 2016). Here the mafias act similarly to what Olson defines "a stationary bandit" (Olson 1993). They exercise a form of "territorial sovereignty" (Chinnici and Santino 1991; Santino 1995), so they maintain a strong – usually military – control on social, political, economical, even the private life of the local community. In new expansion areas, instead, the relationship with the territory is "more fluid and flexible" (Sciarrone 2014: 28).

Space is always a strategic resource for the organizations (Crang and Thrift 2000) and obviously, also for mafias. In traditional contexts territory play a key role from different

² It defines mafia as an association whose members take advantage from submission and omertà in order to commit crimes, to take control over economic activities (directly or indirectly) or to achieve unjust profits or advantages for themselves or for others.

³ Santoro points out three analytical dimensions in which the theoretical space of social research about mafia is situated. He has supposed that the key role could be found in the structure, someone else in the identity and for others the most important factor is the agency (Santoro 2015). Santino, instead, proposes the "complexity paradigm" that presents mafia as a multifaceted prism (Santino 2006).

⁴ "An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct" (Weber, 1949).

perspectives: at first, it is considered in literature the principal “factor of accumulation”. Through the relationship established in their original area, mafias also obtain material resources and social capital⁵. Lastly, it is also the grounds of their construction of identity and social recognisability (Sciarrone 2016).

The table 1 compare principal characteristics of traditional and non-traditional mafias’ entrenched model, based on literary review and analysis of the most important judicial inquires in traditional (especially Calabria and Sicily) and non-traditional regions (especially Lazio, Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna and Liguria) in the last seven years. This timeframe has been chosen due to the fact that public and also academic interests on the issue of mafias’ expansion had been considerably increased after “Crimine – Infinito” inquiry on July 2010. This showed, for the first time in an organic and structured way, ‘ndrangheta’s successfully transplantation in Northern Italy and its internal organization.

TABLE 1
MAFIAS’ ENTRENCHED MODELS. DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL

<i>Entrenched model characteristics</i>	<i>Territorial sovereignty</i>	<i>Economic mafia</i>
Where	Places	Spaces
Intimidation and power’s accumulation factor	Social control, violence as possible resource, reputation	Violence as possible resource, corruption, system of relationship
Benefits	Consideration, power, social capital, resources, identity, social recognisability	Power, resources
Relationship with politic	Systematic	Not necessary
Organizational structure	Hierarchical	Flat/flexible
Presence on the territory	Monopoly	Possible/Frequent presence of other OCs

At first, based on Giddens’ definition the notion of “place is best conceptualised by means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically” (Giddens 1990: 18). So, one of elements that could define the traditional model is the fact that it is played on a place, instead of in a space. On this issue see also Colombo e Navarini: they point out that the notion of place underlines cultural dimension of social activity based geographically. It refers to identity, relationships and sense (Colombo and Navarini 1999).

Their construction of power and intimidation are founded upon, in both cases, the ability to use violence as a resource (dalla Chiesa 2010). Violence, even if it is only to threaten, is the more efficient way to obtain power and control over local society (Santino 1995). The first model exhibits control used over the local communities and reliance on their reputation. In the non- traditional model, the organization is fearsome due to its ability to weave relationships and eventually push out hostile actors from sectors where

⁵ In this case the social capital’s definition is taken by Sciarrone (1998) that applies Coleman’s definition to mafia organizations, but not all authors agree, i.e. dalla Chiesa uses Putnam one (Putnam, 1993).

they operate. Corruption is obviously another very efficient instrument, specifically in areas of new expansion in order to obtain public contracts (Lavoragna and Sergi 2014).

In Sciarrone's opinion, (Sciarrone 2016) "territorial power" (the power exercised in a specific and limited local context) is a useful instrument for gathering resources, creating and maintaining social recognition and, last but not least, for forming those partnerships that could comprise their social capital.

In the first model, clans meddle in politics to control the vote, but sometimes also to present their own men in electoral competitions (see model of joint participation in dalla Chiesa 2012). In the second one it seems to be more useful and less risky to form partnership with bureaucratic actors in local administration instead of politicians. This due to the fact that politicians could change more frequently than bureaucrats.

From the point of view of the structure, it seems to be that usually in non-traditional context criminal organizations adopt a less hierarchical structure (Varese 2011; Martone 2017).

And finally, in a traditional entrenchment the mafia group has the monopoly in the local criminal context, while with an "economic mafia" model there is a coexistence, due to the fact that the organization has to share wide markets instead of a territory.

ROME: A CASE STUDY OF A NEW EXPANSION AREA AND OF THE RELEVANCE OF LOCAL MAFIAS

Rome is an important and challenging case of a new expansion area to study. Here traditional mafias, local mafias and organized crimes live together, sharing territories and markets.

All the traditional mafias moved to this territory since the 1970s mainly to reinvest their illicit profits in the legal economy, but also to invest in entrepreneurial activities (DNA 2017). Differently from what happened i.e. in Lombardy or in Piedmont (see Cross 2014; Sciarrone et al. 2014), those groups have never been structured in a traditional way, both for a strategic decision and a specific need (Pignatone and Prestipino 2015).

So, what made Rome a really peculiar context is the presence of a very strong and embedded local mafias, started with Banda della Magliana experience in 1970s.

In the past few years, several groups have been identified in the urban area which could be considered local mafias. The most important are the Casamonicas in the Southern part of the city, and the Cordaros, a small criminal group operating in Tor Bella Monaca (this excludes Ostia, which will be analysed in the next paragraph). Least but not last Mafia capitale, which is perhaps the best-known criminal organization of Rome, an association "original and originating" (Rome's Tribunal 2014a) disrupted by "Mondo di mezzo" inquiry concluded in December 2014.

Not all of these groups have been defined "mafia-type association" based on art. 416 *bis* Italian Penal Code and Tribunal of Rome's jurisprudence on this issue is conflicting. All of them, nevertheless, could be defined mafias-type organization based on the sociological definition of mafia mentioned above⁶.

Despite the relevance of this case, there is a lack of academic literature about Roman mafias. Moreover, there aren't many police inquiries. So, a sources' diversification is a needed.

OSTIA: A TRADITIONAL ENTRENCHED MODEL FOR A NEW MAFIA?

⁶ There is a lively debate in literature on the issue of Mafia capitale and mafia's sociological definition. Two different and relevant approaches could be found in Meridiana 87(3) and in dalla Chiesa 2015.

Ostia is situated on the coast, on the periphery of Rome. It was mostly swampland until Mussolini ordered its reclamation. Its position is strategic for international trafficking, because it caught between Civitavecchia and Fiumicino harbours and the international Leonardo da Vinci airport which are “well-established entry points for drugs” (DNA 2017: 879). In addition, its development potential (in particular through the “economy of the sea”) made this territory very attractive to organized crime.

“The Roman coast is one of areas with the highest criminal density” (Martone 2017) and different form of organized crimes are historically well-established in Ostia.

At first, a large number of mafias fugitives have found refuge along the Roman coast⁷ and since the 1970s several of camorra’s and Cosa nostra’s bosses have moved into this area in order to enter into drug trafficking market. Also, at the end of the 1970s (Martone 2017), one of “batteria”⁸ that composed the Banda della Magliana was formed and developed here, led at the beginning by Nicolino Selis⁹ and, after his homicide in 1981, by Edoardo Toscano and Paolo Frau (Osservatorio Tecnico-Scientifico per la legalità e la sicurezza 2016). Another important boss of the Banda della Magliana (see note 8), Franco Giuseppucci, started his criminal career in a gambling house in Ostia (Bonelli 2017).

More recently, two separate clans, the Triassis family, linked to a very important Cosa nostra’s family, the Cuntrera Caruanas, and the Fascianis, have confronted each other to obtain territorial control. The Fascianis originated from Abruzzo, and moved to Ostia, in order to begin their economic activities (initially bakeries). After Frau was assassinated and others Banda della Magliana survivors were arrested, the Fascianis and the Triassis shared the power, but between 2007 and 2011 they once again started to fight for the territorial control. The Fascianis won, and thereafter, forced the latter to stipulate a “*pax mafiosa*”. During this time the clan of Michele Senese, a former member of Alfieri’s camorra clan who moved to Rome after the camorra war against Cutolo, seemed unaffected by the conflict. It is known he was involved in establishing the *pax* and it is known that his clan’s presence was influential but to what degree we are unsure. Since then he has been arrested.

So, some privileged observers have defined “Ostia model” as a peaceful but armed coexistence, which is always being renegotiated. The respect of this pact is granted by Francesco D’Agati (leader of Villabate “mandamento” in Sicily between 2005 and 2009, now living in Ostia), who acts as an arbiter between the rival groups, grounded on the kudos gained from his relevant criminal career in Cosa nostra (Ferrara, 2017).

The object of this case study, the Fascianis’, exercise their power, in particular, in the area called “Ostia nuova” or “Lido di Ostia Ponente”.

They live here and they have always invested in this very same area. In fact, it is in this region that Rome’s prosecutors have historically seized most of their economic activities. Ostia Nuova is a neighbour of Lido di Ostia and identifies as a very unique community “Ostia is historically separated in two different social realities” (interview with local antimafia activist, Ostia, May 2017). This neighbour has been constructed in

⁷ Angelo Bonelli, politician and former President of Ostia municipality, public speech during “Università itinerante”, Ostia, July 27, 2015.

⁸ The “batterie” were small criminal groups, peculiar of Rome. Three of them formed a stable organization, known as Banda della Magliana. A group from Testaccio, headed by Abbruciati, De Pedis, Pernasetti and Giuseppucci, one from Acilia and Ostia, of which leaders were Selis, Mancini, Lucioli, Toscano, Mancone and Carnovale brothers and lastly one from Magliana, runned by Abbatino, Colafigli, Paradisi, Sicilia, Danesi and Mastropietro (Benincasa 2017).

⁹ He represented at the same time also Cutolo – an important camorra’s boss - and his organization NCO’s interests in this area.

the 1970s in order to solve the problem of “abbaraccati”¹⁰ from the areas of Mandrione, Tiburtino and Alessandrino who were forced to move to a new residential building, built by Roman contractor Renato Armellini. The history of this area made it a “place of relevant contradictions and social marginality” (Bonelli 2017).

Their principle activities are drug and weapons trafficking, exploitation, gambling, extortion and money laundering through several investments in Ostia’s local economy. In particular, they invest in cafes, restaurants and, most of all, lidos (Osservatorio Tecnico – Scientifico per la Sicurezza e la Legalità 2016).

The Fascianis’ presence in the territory is pervasive. Members of clan and also their allies (other criminal groups in the same area, such as the Spadas family) are linked through kinship (i.e. arranged marriages).

The figure 1 shows the Fascianis clan based on Rome’s Tribunal reconstruction (X Court of First Instance 2015)¹¹ in the sentence of the trial developed from the police operation called “Tramonto” in 2014.




Fig. 1- *The Fascianis clan structure based on Rome’s Tribunal reconstruction.*

As is illustrated in the figure, the association leaders are all linked by kinship. This type of relationship is unusual in traditional mafias, especially in non-traditional areas (even in ‘ndrangheta, which is known for its familiar structure) (Campana and Varese 2013) and made rituals and owes unnecessary (Sciarrone 2014).

As the association’s role depicted in the figure shows, the Fascianis clan exercised a strong pressure on entrepreneurs. Extortion is the most evident symbol of their power (La Spina 2008). A Rome prosecutor inquiring into the profits gained through this activity, reports that a cooperating witness has said: “It is a question of respect. For people like us, 500 euros per month is a small thing” (Prestipino in Martone 2017).

¹⁰ In Rome “abbaraccati” means those people who lived in extempore hovels in some specific areas of the city.

¹¹ This judgment was also confirmed by the Court of Second Instance in June 2017. In another lawsuit (called “Nuova Alba”) against the Fascianis, the sentences were different from the First and the Second courts (mafia association for the first and criminal organization for the second). In October 2017, the decision regarding the Cassazione’s sentence will be announced.

Even if general opinion is that in non-traditional territory violence is rare, in Ostia this statement seems not to be true. For instances, since 2002, there have been seven occurrences of homicides or kneecappings and, between 2007 and 2015, 35 reports of intimidations against businesses (particularly lidos and bars) (Rome's Tribunal 2015b)¹². Violence is also used as a resource to solicit money from entrepreneurs. An informer explains; "if you want tranquillity in this area, it means that I don't bother you...or I burn your business or I burn your car or I come in and disturb..." (Sebastiano Cassia¹³, in Rome's Tribunal 2015b: 44). "In Ostia, sometimes something catches on fire" (Sabella in CPA 2015: 6).

And finally, it is efficient to build their criminal reputation, as explains another cooperating witness; "...Punish one to educate 100...this methodology is used in Sicily but also in other criminal contexts..." (Sebastiano Cassia, in Rome's Tribunal 2015b: 45).

They also pay attention to social acceptance: for instances, they are organized, as traditional mafias are, to pay a sort of salary to the families of the ones that have been arrested. Also, lidos have responded to this strategic need. In fact, to gain the "access to the sea" is prestigious (interview with local antimafia activist, Ostia, May 2017; on the issue of strategical importance of economic activities see Cross 2015). In particular, they owned (irrespective of whether or not it is formally assigned to a front man) a lido, the "Village", even if seized by the authorities at the moment. The Village was an important meeting point¹⁴ and facilitate the Fascianis family in forging relationships with local entrepreneurs and the upper classes (Sabella 2017). They were also in contact with the Assobalneari (trade association of lidos' entrepreneurs), professionals and banks; some of them decide to relate with the Fascianis not for fear but for convenience (Rome's Tribunal 2014).

In particular, the lidos are frequently presented as a sector where illegality and breaches of law are common and rooted (on this issue an interesting and documented academic research is the one recently proposed by Martone 2017).

The Spadas "assign" council housing that were occupied previously by them and they opened, in an area of social unease near Gasparri square, a popular gym with activities of social inclusion, frequented by many local children and youths (Martone 2017). But this building also was "practically illegally occupied" as reported by Alfonso Sabella¹⁵ (CPA 2015: 5).

So, in the last 30 years they built such a solid social control that they aren't facing condemnation by entrepreneurs who have been extorted and none are prepared to testify against them. Their power seems to not be damage even after judicial inquires have led to arrests within the major members of the clan.

From a political point of view, the infiltration in the municipality seems to be evident due to the fact that it was dissolved firstly in 1992 for corruption and then again in 2015 for mafia infiltration. The inquires showed that local clans were able to influence political decisions and prevent a normal development of public life.

The table below illustrates the characteristics of the Fasciani's entrenched model in Ostia.

¹² The quantitative date on number of intimidations are obviously underestimate due to the fact that usually this type of crime isn't reported by the victim to the authorities.

¹³ Sebastiano Cassia was a member of Cosa nostra's clan Santapaola and he has started its activity in Ostia since the 1980s.

¹⁴ On the importance of the study of meeting points in mafias analysis, see Meli, 2015.

¹⁵ When Ignazio Marino was Rome's mayor, Alfonso Sabella was his councilor for Legality and Transparency and then he has been made responsible for Ostia.

TABLE 2
THE FASCIANIS' ENTRENCHED MODEL IN OSTIA

<i>Entrenched model characteristics</i>	<i>Ostia</i>
<i>Where</i>	Place
<i>Intimidation and power's accumulation factor</i>	Social control, violence, reputation, social acceptance
<i>Benefits</i>	Power, resources, social recognisability
<i>Relationship with politic</i>	Systematic
<i>Organizational structure</i>	Hierarchical and familiar
<i>Presence on the territory</i>	Other OCs Presented

Corruption may be a useful instrument not only because this is a non-traditional area (see above), but also because there is an explicit pact among the criminal organizations to maintain a peace, and hence avoid police attention (even if corruption continues to be an available resource). However, in this case, violence appears to be the most used and efficient resource. What seems to be significantly different from “territorial sovereignty” model is the identity issue, because this clan doesn’t present any form of symbolism to be legitimized.

DISCUSSIONS

The case study presented seems to exactly correspond to the traditional entrenched model, even if the initial conditions were supposed to prevent it. Keeping the literature in mind, Ostia is actually too large and populated to allow the establishment of the mafias. And, also, in an urban context, local mafias should not be able to systematically encroach upon politics and to collect resources.

Beyond the mere juridical definition, on which, as it is said above, the debate is still open, the Fascianis group behaves as a mafia-type organization. However, two elements still continue to be different from the classical entrenchment model. The first is the renunciation of the possibility to create a monopoly. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, at this specific moment, they prefer peace rather than a much too visible war. The second element is a lack of a specific identity. This question is frequently opposed by who affirm that Mafia capitale isn’t a proper mafia. Some claim that is impossible to define as mafia an organization with no rituals, history and identity. Because of this, this organization would be destined to dissolution after the death or capture of its boss. Family structure seems to indicate a solution to this problem, by assuring that there are descendants and fidelity.

Some Ostia’s characteristics could have facilitated this type of settlement. In particular, a widespread lack of legality; in politics, demonstrated by the fact that the municipal council had been dissolved twice in the last 30 years, and also in economy, as the frequent breaches challenged the lidos entrepreneurs show. Secondly, even if Ostia maintains a large population with extended neighbourhood, this type of control is exercised on a specific part of the territory where there are pockets of poverty, underdevelopment and social unease.

In conclusion, mafia entrenchment model still seems to be not only efficient but easily expandable to new area, even in a metropolitan context that have right requirements, as is Rome.

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