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of risks for individuals, work
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Risk analysis of the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees – SPRAR. A classification of risks for individuals, work organisation and security ¹

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In Italy, the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) manages the second reception of migrants with the proposal of a social and economic inclusion of them in the local context. This analysis focuses on the perception of SPRAR operators. Its aim is to identify and analyse risk factors of SPRAR centres in Rome, and finally it introduces a classification for individuals, work organization and security. The main goal is to emphasize contradictions of this reception system in order to develop preventive measures within the SPRAR organization in terms of policy. The aim is to improve the integration of asylum seekers and refugees in the urban area.

INTRODUCTION

In Italy, the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) manages the second reception of forced migrants. This organization, founded by the law n. 189/2002 and composed by the network of local governments, uses the available resources of National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services provided by Government finance law and managed by the Ministry of Interior. Its main goal is to realize reception projects for refugees and asylum seekers in order to ensure their socio-economic inclusion within local contexts in cooperation with voluntary and third sector organizations. An agreement between national executive, regional and local governments was signed on 10th July 2014 in order to create a national reception system which wants to face the growing number of people arrived on the Italian coasts.

The provided services consist in inclusion of migrants in the national health and scholastic system, orientation and access to other local services, professional training, job placement, legal assistance and social and housing integration².

Indeed, it is crucial to emphasize that the Italian reception system is characterized by extreme fragmentation. Only SPRAR provides this services with the goal of enabling social and economic inclusion of hosted people in local context, which is why we talk about second reception centres. In Italy, there are, however, many different types of first

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² For further information: www.sprar.it.

and extraordinary reception centres³, in which there are more than 70% of forced migrants and asylum seekers (IDOS, 2016).

It is interesting to analyse in depth risk factors that may arise inside SPRAR organization, although it has distinguished itself on the national territory for its goals, for the structure of its interventions and numerous best practices in a restructuring phase which will lead to render it as the unique Italian reception system. Therefore, the case study of the SPRAR network in Rome appears to be ideal to bring out contradictions, risk and development factors of the system in an improvement and enhancement perspective.

In addition, the Italian national chronicle has reported numerous episodes of low-quality reception, also with subsequent episodes of violence within SPRAR structures, as well as the occurrence of a large number of protests by Italian citizens against the presence of asylum seekers and refugees in urban areas. For this reason, I thought it was necessary to start a risk analysis process of SPRAR organization of Rome focused on its operators (social workers, psychologists, social assistants and other professional figures) and their risk perception. Therefore, the main goal of this investigation is to identify and analyse risk factors of SPRAR centres, by highlighting events, causes and consequences of them. Last but not least another goal is to show its impact on local context in order to improve the integration of asylum seekers and refugees in the urban area.

THEORETICAL FRAME

The phenomenon of globalisation, the fast changes of technology and the modern lifestyle produce the belief on the industrialized population that they have to face more risk today than in the past and that the risks of the future will be even worse (Bauman, 2010; Slovic, 1987). Cultural theorists have explained that people organize their own perceptions in an active way and they select what or who to fear in order to preserve their state of life. The perception of different types of risks is linked to cultural biases, values and beliefs and structures different sorts of social relationships (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990).

Since 2014, the gradual increase of migrants landing on Italian coasts and the consequent need to organize their reception gave birth to an association between migrants and security in the public debate (Ambrosini, 2011; Battistelli, 2008; Dal Lago, 2012; Quassoli and Carbonato, 2013; Solivetti, 2013). Moreover, as recent surveys on European and national opinion show, the presence of foreign people in Italy seems to increase the sense of insecurity felt by citizens (Battistelli, 2008; Bauman, 2016; Castel, 2004; Eurobarometer, 2014; Demos, 2017).

Mass media and politicians communication influences and alters risk perception of citizens on topics of major importance such as immigration and security. Their aim is the *newsworthiness*⁴ and electoral support which are often conquered by following the research and identification of a scapegoat, by using a *hate speech* and not by analysing real causes of the phenomena. This explains why risk is a social construct represented, hidden or exaggerated strategically using specific technical material (Beck, 2000).

Citizens driven by a natural psychosocial fear and manipulated by mass media and political discourse, which represents the phenomenon of migration as a threat, develop a

³ The Italian reception centres are undergoing reorganization and renaming and the main ones are CPSA (First Aid and Reception Centres), Hotspot, CIE (Expulsion Identification Centres) who will be CPR (Centres for Repatriation), CDA (Reception Centres), CARA (Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers) who will be regionals Hub and finally CAS (Extraordinary Reception Centres).

⁴ *Newsworthiness* means transforming an event in a news.

growing sense of insecurity that often is manifested in a violent way (Battistelli, 2016; Galantino, 2010). Therefore, a negative representation of migrants could produce conflict situations within local contexts, particularly in *sensitive neighbourhoods* (Castel, 2004; Wacquant, 2006), such as cities suburbs.

Not all social systems are immune to these processes-trends. If we focus our attention on organizations as social systems, we can see that they are characterized by the logic and the ways in which they pursue their goals. It must be noted that the level and degree of risk that pass through them tends to increase. This risk is much more concrete when organizations are not structured to handle this potential danger and insecurity. Risk management, as well as management tools, are expressions of activities and actions of all the actors involved and operating in a given context. They, in their respective responsibilities, act to contribute to the overall improvement of the quality of the activities provided by each organizational structure. This is the reason why it is important to apply risk management to organizations working on fields other than healthcare and finance where it is already affirmed.

The concepts of danger, risk and threat (Battistelli, 2008; Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1994) as well as organizational culture (Hatch, 1999; Schein, 1998) are fundamental to understand risk factors. The process of *sensemaking* within organization and moral involvement of individuals affects the answers to risk and its perception (Douglas, 1991; Weick, 1995). At this point, talking about "highly reliable organizations" is utopian because most of adverse events depend on human action in accordance with the rules and norms that characterize the habitual functioning of organization. Thus, in order to identify the risk factors, it is necessary to analyse the organizational form, the relationship between the members of the organization and its artefacts, without neglecting institutional order and norms that allow the management, as well as its maintenance and development.

Reason (1998) describes the "trajectory of accident opportunity", explaining how occurrence of a mistake depends on a path that, stemming from organizational choices and erroneous management, is able to creep into the system by destroying what protects it and by causing the adverse event. The active contribution of people in the organization, if encounters what is undesirable and invisible within the organization itself, develops and directs the path of risk opportunity. Consequently, deciding to use an organizational perspective means focusing on decisions taken by social actors of a particular organization in order to achieve operational and/or managerial goals. Causes must be sought within the same organizational processes (Baldissera, 1998).

Simon and Barnard argue that all organizations are cooperative system that preserve and accumulate over time the memory of the decisions taken. So, one of the most effective ways to expand limited rationality is to benefit from past experiences and to resort to procedures as much as possible, based on knowledge and calculations. Procedures reduce uncertainty of those who have to decide (Bonazzi, 2008). Individuals are capable of developing strategies within organization and their private rationality which may not correspond to the organizational goals and could lead to unmanageable conduct. This could lead to degenerative processes that can produce organizations to some dysfunction and disadvantages (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977).

Selznick (1948) explains that tools created to achieve a given goal have a life of their own and also have conservation needs that may conflict with the same purpose they were created for. The leadership of management of crucial importance is the ability to take critical decisions considered as a creative activity that makes the institution a subject capable of taking initiatives, as well as the concept of role. It is in the continuous interweaving between role identification and the distance from it that the sense of role takes shape. Therefore, Goffman argues that we need to keep in mind the complementary

mechanisms that push for role compliance and those that distance people from their prescribed roles. The changing balance between adherence and distance creates our overall personality. Anyway, finding this balance is hard and this is why the process of burnout is easy to face (Bonazzi, 2008).

Strategies of security management have therefore to identify risks, discover risk causes and, finally, avoid risks. A positive risk management conducts to a continuous negotiation and reassessment of meaning that could cause other ambiguities and/or reveal new goals (Weick, 2015). Thus, individuals working inside these organizations need to learn and to take advantage of uncertainty, because it is important to understand that “risk” also means “opportunity” (Drucker in Bonazzi, 2008).

METHODOLOGY

In order to realize the risk analysis of SPRAR centres in Rome, I decided to use an ethnographic approach that is traced back to the naturalist-constructivist philosophical paradigm where the vision of facts is investigated locally. Ethnographers, indeed, study subjects, artefacts and actions in their interactions, from an interpretative-dialectical point of view, without the claim of absolute objectivity of the results (Piccardo and Benozzo, 1996).

I decided to use focused narrative interviews because they turn to individuals, they aim for their “understanding”, and this is part of the renewed interest in the subject's centrality and in the “deliberately intentional” social action (Weber, 1922). It is also an approach that allows investigating deeply the phenomena. It is a very interactive and flexible approach which is able to empathize in the perspective of the subject being studied. This makes it easier to interview marginal subjects neglected by “official knowledge” and to rediscover the social function of research, which is “giving voice to those who do not have it” (Crespi, 1985, pp. 351).

As there is no literature and researches that takes into account and analyses the risk factors of SPRAR centres, this type of methodology appears to be the most appropriate for achieving the research goal. In addition to this, observation and fieldwork are supported by a strong theoretical basis that offers its help to the researcher for the understanding of the social world, providing an order that supports him in his critical analysis of the facts. So, empirical work and theory support each other (Silverman, 2002). Narrative approach then, as theorized by MacIntyre, Bruner and Czarniawska, is highly adaptable to the study of organizations in order to analyze the collected data. This approach is characterized for attention given to concrete situations and not to general theorizations (Czarniawska, 1991).

Hence, research can be summarized in the following phases:

1- Document analysis:

- a) Secondary data analysis provided by Italian and European statistical institutes.
- b) Contents analysis of official documents:
 - regulations, guidelines and models adopted by SPRAR organization;
 - governance, organizational structure, roles and responsibilities;
 - SPRAR operator's reports;
 - policy declarations and media content.

2- Participant observation in:

- a SPRAR centre (20 reception places increased to 40 in the south-eastern suburbs of Rome, Town Hall VII) - Start observation: January 16, 2017 – ongoing;

- nine meetings of social operators working in SPRAR reception centres of Rome and province, as well as in CARA and CAS of other regions of Italy;
- one political protest against the opening of a SPRAR centre in Town Hall XIII, on the north-western suburb of Rome.

4- Narrative focused interviews to:

- SPRAR operators working in SPRAR centres of Rome;
- operators, asylum seekers and refugees from SPRAR centre observed in Town Hall VII of Rome.

I have created a first classification of risk factors characterizing SPRAR centres in Rome and a first list of consequences that can hurt people hosted, SPRAR operators, local community and the SPRAR organization itself by applying this analysis, which is still ongoing. Indeed, classifications – despite being imperfect rationalities and not pretending to exhaust the complexity of social reality – are one of the most valuable and effective tools to counter ambiguities and paradoxes.

To build this risk factors classification, I chose to consider those already present in field of safety at work, referring in particular to Italian Health and Safety Text on Work (D.lgs. 81/08), European Framework Directive on Safety and Health at Work (Directive 89/391 EEC) and to recommendations focused on psycho-social risks of European Agency for Safety and Health on Work (EU-OSHA). I finally created dimensions, categories and types of risk considering these references and basing the risk classification of SPRAR centres on criteria of *fundamentum divisionis*, exhaustiveness and mutual exclusivity of all categories (Marradi, 2007).

RISK FACTORS CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRAR ORGANIZATION IN ROME

Through the first analysis of documents, observations and interviews, I have been able to identify and subdivide some risk factors that characterize SPRAR centres of Rome in three main dimensions: security, work organization and individuals. Moreover, each dimension is divided into some risk categories that refer to specific risk factors (Tab. 1).

TABLE 1 <i>RISK FACTORS CLASSIFICATION – SPRAR OF ROME</i>	
DIMENSIONS	RISK CATEGORIES
Security	- Management of procedures and security systems; - design and management of SPRAR centres spaces; - technical-instrumental risk.
Work organization	- Human resources management; - organizational management of work.
Individuals	- Hygienic and sanitary risk; - management of people hosted.

The security dimension includes three main categories refer to risk arising from the management of procedures and security systems, the design and the management of the centres spaces and technical-instrumental risk. Furthermore, the risk dimension of work organization refers to two categories, the risk arising from human resources management and from organizational management of work. The dimension of individuals mentions two categories identifiable in the hygienic and sanitary risk and in the risk arising from the management of people hosted.

Regarding the security risk dimension (Tab. 2) there are three possible risk factors related to management of procedures and security systems, such as lack of vigilance or unqualified vigilantes, absence of alarm or means of signalling and unrestricted access to visitors. These factors give rise to a low overall level of security that make particularly attractive large SPRAR centres for theft, other external attacks and/or the introduction in structures of people who are not regularly hosted.

Marco⁵: “[...] a part of Casapound, a part of the [North] League... They did a real garrison in front of the entrance [of the SPRAR centre] and for six months they were there before. So, I do not tell you the stress, in short... It also happened that I could not go out, I had to be escorted, I had to go on foot, even to get out. I had to go out for a cardiopathic person and I had to be escorted by the police. That is, I tried to go out alone and I was surrounded by ten characters”.

RISK CATEGORIES	RISK FACTORS
Management of procedures and security systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of vigilance or presence of unqualified; vigilantes - absence of means of signalling or alarm; - unrestricted access to visitors.
Design and management of the centres spaces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large concentration of people hosted; - no privacy; - particular setting of some areas; - placement of centres in degraded areas and/or isolated positions on the territory; - placement of several adjacent SPRAR centres; - different reception projects and categories of hosts.
Technical-instrumental risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Malfunctioning of equipment (telephone, printer, copier, PC); - no shared use of Anthology portal by operators.

Concerning the risk category of the design and management of centres spaces is to be noted the high presence of SPRAR centres with a large concentration of people hosted, from a minimum of 6 reception places to a maximum of 400.

Maurice: “On paper SPRAR is a great project to help migrants [...] but from the inside is not so, because you already start from big numbers. If you want to talk about reception you cannot crowd people in centres of 50, 100 or more people, you should look for a form of distribution/placing of migrants in another way, in groups of up to ten, because overcoming this number you are already unable to work with humanity”.

It is also possible to insert in this category the general no privacy of the spaces of the centres and the particular setting of some areas such as canteen halls and common areas. These areas, due to their inadequate size, cannot accommodate all the hosted people together. This often causes internal conflicts between hosts and difficulties for operators

⁵ For reasons of privacy I chose to give fantasy names to the operators interviewed. All the interviews were made by the author from May to August, 2017 in Rome.

in the management of turns. In addition to this, many SPRAR centres are adjacent to each other and most of them are placed in proximity to Gypsy camps, generally in suburbs, degraded areas and/or isolated positions of city.

Maurice: “The other centres are scattered across peripheral territory in extreme discomfort situations and it is easy to see in an uncomfortable situation the inclusion of hundred people who have other problems to bring more discomfort. It's like giving a slap to someone who's already dying. You have to work on the territory”.

This generates the possibility of robberies to operators and people hosted, as well as the lack of interaction between hosts and the local communities and the birth of feelings of contrast by citizens of the suburbs.

Then, the presence of the SPRAR in structures with different reception projects and categories of hosts (minor, adult, vulnerable) produces some problems to operators in their management of work. The last category of security dimension refers to technical-instrumental risk, which includes the obsolete and malfunctioning equipment (phone, printer, copier, PC) and an uncommon use of Anthology portal by operators, which limits its monitoring function. The first factor can produce the elongation of working time and the possible confusion or loss of documents with sensitive data to be printed or copied.

The dimension related to work organization (Tab. 3) includes two categories of risk related to the human resources management and to the organizational management of work.

TABLE 3 <i>WORK ORGANIZATION DIMENSION – SPRAR OF ROME</i>	
RISK CATEGORIES	RISK FACTORS
Human resources management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inexpert staff; - contractual framing of operators at lower levels; - lack of compulsory and free training for staff; - inadequateness of number working hours and operators/hosts ratio; - absence or shortage of operators on the night shift; - no fixed presence of social assistant, psychologist and cultural mediator within the centres; - confusion in the definition of roles, responsibilities and skills of operators; - poor structuring of team meetings; - lack of a shared work methodology; - absence or poor effectiveness of supervision; - poor effectiveness of Central Service monitoring; - irregular salary payments for operators.
Organizational management of work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delays or non-distribution of pocket money, metro cards, hygiene kits, seasonal clothing (from 2014 to 2016); - inefficient organization of services provided; - restrictions on feeding; - restrictions on exit from the centres.

The category of human resources management has different risk factors. Firstly, the employment of inexpert staff and often a contractual framing of operators at lower levels than expected (e.g. level C2 to B1), as well as a lack of effective compulsory and free

training of staff beyond the basic one. Moreover, there are no training or prevention policies on management of conflict and violent situations.

Working hours seems not enough, especially for social assistants and psychologist. These professional figures work in more than one SPRAR centres at a time. In fact, there are not daily professional figures in the structures, such as the cultural mediator who is called only in cases of special need. Furthermore, numerical ratio between operators and hosts is inadequate, particularly during night shifts when there is the total absence of operators or only one present. In opposition to this, during daily turns two or three operators are present for more than one hundred hosts.

Lorenzo: “Imagine the tension that could be created in a situation of hundred people who have different needs to carry forward. The most delicate moments, beyond meals, are in the night, anything could happen and you could be locked in the office without interacting with anyone else, because you were alone”.

It is also remarkable a lack of shared work methodology, even in SPRAR centres managed by the same cooperative and confusion in definition of roles, responsibilities and skills of operators.

Andrea: “A hundred-seat centre has a change of sheets and other things to do at regular expiration, so there are several things that you do. Then there is the part where you do your own job. [...] because working with hundred people it is hard to follow them all, if you have an hour in turn to follow them...because then we had to make the rounds for the rooms... let's go to see... that's all that went out from the real job”.

In addition, despite being considered very effective tools by operators, a poor structuring of team meetings and a total absence or poor effectiveness of supervision of the staff has to be noted. It emerges also a poor effectiveness of SPRAR Central Service monitoring. Despite being done once a year and shows strong critical issues, there is no further control after the annual monitoring to observe resolution of the critical issues.

Federica: “Yet despite the monitoring it was negative, the situation never changed, so I wonder what the function of this monitoring is... If you come to do the monitoring and see that we did not do half an internship, what is the sense that we continue to keep that place open?! That place also brings your name, because we are talking about SPRAR”.

Finally, the last risk factor for this category refers to irregular salary payments for operators, also with six months of delay, strongly compromising the quality of life and work of the operators.

On the other side, the category of organizational management of work includes risk factors referred to services provided by SPRAR. In fact, from 2014 to 2016 in the centres investigated for Mafia Capital, there have been some delays or non-distribution of the principal supplies such as pocket money, metro cards, hygiene kits and seasonal clothing, causing some conflicts. Therefore, there are some problems in the organization of services provided such as the research of apprenticeships, training courses and housing for hosts. In fact, cooperatives to activate these services have to anticipate money before accessing SPRAR funds, so often these are not used. Moreover, there is a need to improve general activities, play-recreational spaces and to reinforce relationship with the local community and associations.

Then, also restrictions on feeding, both as regards meal autonomy and food quality, are another risk factor. In fact, generally, the meal is delivered through catering and there is a low quality and quantity of food, usually always the same and different from the hosts culture. At last, there are imposing limits on prolonged releases and not by the centres.

The last dimension refers to the risks that affect the person, so I chose to define it individuals (Tab. 4).

The first risk factor of the category of hygienic and sanitary risk regards the delays in health screening for hosts. Often, they arrive in SPRAR from centres of first reception without having made a specific medical check-up and without knowing any pathologies. However, it is enough ordinary the taken care of people with serious health problems such as psychiatric problems, tuberculosis, scabies and also a case of leukaemia. Therefore, related are two other risk factors such as the improper use and the exchange of medicines by hosts (e.g. sleeping pills) and the absence of specifically medical examinations for members of staff.

TABLE 4 <i>INDIVIDUALS DIMENSION – SPRAR OF ROME</i>	
RISK CATEGORIES	RISK FACTORS
Hygienic and sanitary risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delays in health screening; - reception of people hosted with serious health problems (tuberculosis, scabies, etc.); - improper use of medicines by people hosted; - no specifically medical examinations for staff.
Management of people hosted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Linguistic/cultural barriers; - strong stress and anger of hosts, due to traumas suffered and to long times for recognition of legal status and documents; - increase in the number of people whose Commission has denied asylum; - increase of people with vulnerabilities; - hosts who already have a history of violence.

Finally, the risk category concerns the management of people hosted includes risk factors related to the personal conditions and story of hosts. The first risk factor is related to the general linguistic/cultural barriers. Then, people hosted feel strong stress and anger due to the traumas suffered and to the long times for the recognition of legal status and documents. Moreover, there is an increase in number of people hosted with vulnerabilities and whose Commission has denied asylum. Lastly, there are risks related to people hosted who already have a history of violence.

Roberto: “Keep in mind that most people arriving are really refugees, they have almost all very strong traumas. So, on their back they have very complicated situations and even people who should have psychiatric care, should stay in smaller centres, ad hoc, are mix all together and then, in short, everything happens, everything can happen”.

It is possible to identify some consequences of these risk factors that could affect operators, people hosted, local community and the SPRAR organization itself.

The SPRAR operators have to face possible conflicts and/or reduction of trust to management, colleagues and/or people hosted. Moreover, their professional role risks

being relegated only to care and control of people hosted and they risk of suffering and/or acting violence. The SPRAR operators could face a reduction of their work performances, motivation and morals with a consequent loss of confidence in themselves and in their professional skills. Finally, they risk to manifest avoidance behaviours that could become burnout and develop in absenteeism and dismissal.

The first consequences that people hosted could face are the processes of infantilism and depersonalization. They could miss their motivation in the reception project, as well as to loss their confidence in operators and in SPRAR organization. Also, they could have to face conflicts with operators and/or other hosts. They could have an increase of their personal vulnerabilities. Consequently, they have to face possible situation of suffering and/or acts violence, self-harm and suicide. Moreover, there is a lack of integration within the local community that could lead to an inclusion in criminal networks (e.g. trafficking, theft, prostitution) and to not achieving of (re)conquest of autonomy. Finally, they risk to loss their trust in the host country and feel hatred for it.

At the same time, even SPRAR organization is not immune from possible damages. Firstly, it has to face a high turnover of staff and a reducing of loyalty and creativity levels of own human resources. The environment of the organization risk to be less favourable for doing efficient and effective work. In addition, there is the possibility of unlawful seizure and/or damage to structures by people hosted, citizens and/or extremist political groups opposed to SPRAR. Finally, SPRAR organization risks to damage its image and to fail its mission.

Moreover, there is also an impact on the local community in which it is located. The consequences that citizens could face are the increase of perception of insecurity and in nationalist/populist feelings. Lastly, there is an increase of feeling of abandonment towards central and local institutions that can lead to conflicts with migrants who become “scapegoats”.

CONCLUSION

In the universe of the Italian reception centres, the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) seems the most adequate form to ensure a social and economic inclusion of migrants in the country. In fact, it is the only type of centre to provide a series of services aimed at overcoming a basic reception, as well as distinguished itself for its best practices. It is necessary to overcome the extremely fragmentary Italian reception system by aligning it to SPRAR model, as argue the same SPRAR organization, Minister of Interior, UNHCR and many other protection associations.

The risk analysis of the SPRAR network in Rome through the investigation of the perception of its operators appears to be ideal to show the contradictions of this system and to develop preventive measures and policy.

The complex dynamics of a metropolitan city and the large asylum seekers basin that attracts weigh heavily on Rome. Therefore, the risk classification resulting from the analysis could be a useful tool to improve management of SPRAR centres in metropolitan cities as Rome, by intervening in the risk dimensions detected and reducing the factors that emerged. This analysis is an example of a how non-farsighted management can lead to significant consequences from multiple points of view.

At this point, what seems most useful is to apply a serious control of tenders and cooperatives that play the role of managing body. Often the real mission of cooperatives is to earn, saving on the management of the centres, and not seriously working to a real inclusion of migrants in local context. Consequently, positive results are achieved thanks to the work overload of operators who are trained on this topic and pursue the real mission of the organization despite their unfavourable working conditions.

Therefore, it is essential to monitor staff recruitment and to provide an adequate level of education and professional training for SPRAR operators, ensuring a continuous and specific training on the job over time. Moreover, the most important part of their work must be directed to improve the relationship with people hosted rather than their control.

It is necessary to scrap the «logic of the great number». This logic is completely in contradiction with the idea promoted by SPRAR of a “widespread reception” of migrants on the territory, in apartments or small centres (15-20 people). It is possible for these professional figures to implement such interventions targeted at individual person only with a limited number of people hosted.

Moreover, it would be possible in this way to reduce or eliminate completely the majority of the risk factors identified. It is for highlight that the risk opportunity trajectory toward the adverse events develop itself especially within large centres.

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