English Written Examination – C1 9 Credits - January 15th 2020

Instructions: This is a test of your ability to read and understand a text in English and to express yourself in the written language. You have **TWO** hours to complete the exam. **Answer all the questions** as you will lose points for unanswered questions. Make your answers complete and concise (180 – 200 words).
Use your own words and paraphrase where possible. You will get **NO** credit for copying pieces of text.
Write only on official paper with a blue or black pen, not pencil. You may use a monolingual dictionary. Hand in the text with your written answers at the end of the exam.

Charlemagne: Reading the cards *The Economist,* November 16th 2019

1. After reading the article carefully, explain why the author believes it is difficult to make correct prognostications about the European Union. Describe the two possible future paths the author has in mind and the various outcomes which may emerge.

2. Explain the following words or phrases (underlined in the text) in the context of the article:

   i) .. a sprawling, labyrinthine, many-centred thing.
   ii) .. a surge of premature obituaries … .
   iii) Chilly international winds may even be toughening it up.
   iv) Europe's muddled complexity is matched by its simple virtues.

3. Answer ONLY ONE of the following questions:

   a) The author refers to 'the smouldering wreck of Brexiteer reveries'. Can you discuss some of the consequences of Great Britain leaving the EU?

   b) What do you think are the biggest challenges for the EU in the next decade? What are the most urgent issues?

   c) Describe to what extent the interplay between the title, subtitle and image in the text conveys meaning and communicates the author's message.

   d) Do you think it is necessary to have a Constitution of Europe? What should it consist of?

Charlemagne | Reading the cards

Our outgoing columnist spies two possible future paths for Europe

LITTLE ABOUT Europe is simple. The EU is a sprawling, labyrinthine, many-centred thing. It tends to move either very slowly or very fast, with shifts creeping forwards over years or suddenly flashing past in hours at late-night summits. National capitals can feel like different universes, with their own electoral and economic cycles, personalities, in-jokes, taboos, histories, myths and ideological constellations. So it can be tricky to identify and explain continent-wide trends, and even more so to anticipate them. No wonder that confidently sweeping analyses of Europe often get the big calls wrong.

Early in the new millennium, the EU's eastward expansion, transatlantic rifts and a mild economic climate together produced a wave of grandiose claims about the European model's sunny future. Books with titles like "The European Dream" and "Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century" hit the shelves. A convention of grandees drew up a blueprint for the EU called a Constitution for Europe. But then the blueprint was rejected at two referendums, economic crisis set in, the euro zone started to wobble, migration soared and the union ended the decade much less struttingly than almost anyone had predicted.

Primary-coloured prognostications about the current decade have proven even more wrong. The peak of the euro crisis around 2012 saw a surge of premature obituaries for the European project, which were reprinted when migration crises, terror attacks and Britain's vote to leave struck over the following years. The EU was said to be paralysed by its divisions and doomed to extremism, destitution and collapse. Yet today, in the twilight of the decade, the picture is cheerier. Economies have recovered, support for the union is at record levels and the last European elections saw turnout rise for the first time in decades. Chilly international winds may even be toughening it up. The EU leads the world in trade liberalisation and technology regulation and its incoming executive calls itself the first "geopolitical" commission. In Emmanuel Macron it has a far-sighted statesman—even if his bold urgings to other leaders are as much exasperated as hopeful.

And what of the next decade? It is highly unlikely that the EU will end the 2020s either as the smouldering wreck of Brexiteer reveries or as the muscular mega-power of Macroniste dreams. As your columnist hands on Charlemagne's crown, he can more easily imagine two distinct but more nuanced possibilities.

In the first, mildly positive, one the EU muddles its way towards a multi-tier structure in which overlapping and concentric circles of states can better co-operate. Different "coalitions of the willing" within the EU emerge to do different things. A group centred on France and Germany creates a common asylum system, the Nordics and the Baltics build a deep digital-services union, and militarily adventurous states like France and Italy complement NATO with midsized interventions close to Europe. An accommodation combining the reduction and pooling of risk in the euro zone paves the way for modest resilience-boosting progress on banking union and closer fiscal co-ordination. Populists remain disruptive, but the centre holds. Europe enters the 2030s as a more hard-nosed figure, with a patchwork of shared interests. Though not comparable in military or technological power to America or China, it is a relevant broker between them.

In the second, more negative, scenario the EU's relative decline is sharper. An economic slowdown in the early 2020s causes more near-death experiences for the euro, hardens the mood against further integration and increases economic divergence. A split between a "northern" and a "southern" euro is seriously discussed. Anaemic growth also sidelines long-term geopolitical and industrial considerations at the expense of short-term fixes and narrow national advantage-seeking. The grind of outside challenges, from technological disruption and migration to terrorism and meddling foreign powers, turns states inward and against each other. As the bloc fails to deal with its problems, public support for the EU drops, although no state actually follows Britain out of the club. Populists paralyse fragmented legislatures, blur into the mainstream and shape a more nationalist, less co-operative agenda. The EU enters the 2030s in one piece, but divided and less relevant, its high relative living standards fraying as Europe falls behind economic rivals and its population ages and shrinks.

Shades of grey

The difference between these two outcomes, and the spectrum of sub-scenarios between them, is measured in the answers to several big questions. Will European leaders find the capacity and political capital to focus on improving their project, even outside moments of high drama? Will they use crises (and there will inevitably be crises) to shove it forward? Will ordinary voters elect politicians who promise only to ease the process of decline, or ones offering vigorous reforms that boost growth? Will the continent become more realistic about the difficult choices it faces over the course of the 21st century, and therefore strive towards the first, imperfect but happier, of the scenarios? The default and probably more likely outcome is the second and unhappier of the two. Mr Macron's recent doom-laden warnings to this newspaper about Europe's need to wake up may have raised eyebrows, but it is much less clear that they will have the desired result.

Europe's muddled complexity is matched by its simple virtues. It remains, thanks in no small part to the EU, the largest cluster of people living in freedom, prosperity and peace on the planet. It is capable of renewal and of verve—and often of combining these things with enlightened approaches to work, health, society, civic rights and the environment. It has much to teach and to otherwise contribute to the rest of the world. None of those things will change overnight if its relative decline proves steeper than necessary. But they will make it that much more of a tragedy. ∎

ENGLISH WRITTEN EXAMINATION   July 11, 2017

C1/ 9 credits

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

The myth of cyber-security   *The Economist*   (April 8, 2017)

1. The article talks about cybersecurity. Why is the author so worried about it? What does he suggest can be done to reduce the risks of cybercrime?

2. Explain the following words or phrases (underlined in the text) in the context of the article:

(i) The arrival of the "Internet of things" will see computers baked into everything ....

(ii) Companies of all stripes should embrace .....

(iii) That encourages them to fix a problem instead of burying it.

(iv) Now imagine the clamour for legislation after the first child fatality involving self-driving cars.

3. Briefly discuss only ONE of the following:

(i) Computers should make our lives easier and better. Do you think this is so? Do we have more control over our lives nowadays with the Internet?

(ii) What does 'being connected' mean to you? Could you live for a week without Internet?

(iii) Comment on the following statement by Charles Kettering, "The world hates change, yet it is the only thing that has brought progress."

(iv) What are the consequences, economic or other, of a breach of cyber-security?

The myth of cyber-security

Computers will never be secure. To manage the risks, look to economics rather than technology

COMPUTER security is a contradiction in terms. Consider the past year alone: cyber-thieves stole $81m from the central bank of Bangladesh; the $4.8bn takeover of Yahoo, an internet firm, by Verizon, a telecoms firm, was nearly derailed by two enormous data breaches; and Russian hackers interfered in the American presidential election.

Away from the headlines, a black market in computerised extortion, hacking-for-hire and stolen digital goods is booming. The problem is about to get worse. Computers increasingly deal not just with abstract data like credit-card details and databases, but also with the real world of physical objects and vulnerable human bodies. A modern car is a computer on wheels; an aeroplane is a computer with wings. The arrival of the "Internet of Things" will see computers baked into everything from road signs and MRI scanners to prosthetics and insulin pumps. There is little evidence that these gadgets will be any more trustworthy than their desktop counterparts. Hackers have already proved that they can take remote control of connected cars and pacemakers.

It is tempting to believe that the security problem can be solved with yet more technical wizardry and a call for heightened vigilance. And it is certainly true that many firms still fail to take security seriously enough. That requires a kind of cultivated paranoia which does not come naturally to non-tech firms. Companies of all stripes should embrace initiatives like "bug bounty" programmes, whereby firms reward ethical hackers for discovering flaws so that they can be fixed before they are taken advantage of.

But there is no way to make computers completely safe. Software is hugely complex. Across its products, Google must manage around 2bn lines of source code—errors are inevitable. The average program has 14 separate vulnerabilities, each of them a potential point of illicit entry. Such weaknesses are compounded by the history of the internet, in which security was an afterthought (see page 69).

Leaving the windows open

This is not a counsel of despair. The risk from fraud, car accidents and the weather can never be eliminated completely either. But societies have developed ways of managing such risk—from government regulation to the use of legal liability and insurance to create incentives for safer behaviour.

Start with regulation. Governments' first priority is to refrain from making the situation worse. Terrorist attacks, like the recent ones in St Petersburg and London, often spark calls for encryption to be weakened so that the security services can better monitor what individuals are up to. But it is impossible to weaken encryption for terrorists alone. The same protection that guards messaging programs like WhatsApp also guards bank transactions and online identities. Computer security is best served by encryption that is strong for everyone.

The next priority is setting basic product regulations. A lack of expertise will always hamper the ability of users of computers to protect themselves. So governments should promote "public health" for computing. They could insist that internet-connected gizmos be updated with fixes when flaws are found. They could force users to change default usernames and passwords. Reporting laws, already in force in some American states, can oblige companies to disclose when they or their products are hacked. That encourages them to fix a problem instead of burying it.

Go a bit slower and fix things

But setting minimum standards still gets you only so far. Users' failure to protect themselves is just one instance of the general problem with computer security—that the incentives to take it seriously are too weak. Often, the harm from hackers is not to the owner of a compromised device. Think of botnets, networks of computers, from desktops to routers to "smart" light bulbs, that are infected with malware and attack other targets.

Most important, the software industry has for decades disclaimed liability for the harm when its products go wrong. Such an approach has its benefits. Silicon Valley's fruitful "go fast and break things" style of innovation is possible only if firms have relatively free rein to put out new products while they still need perfecting. But this point will soon be moot. As computers spread to products covered by established liability arrangements, such as cars or domestic goods, the industry's disclaimers will increasingly butt up against existing laws.

Firms should recognise that, if the courts do not force the liability issue, public opinion will. Many computer-security experts draw comparisons to the American car industry in the 1960s, which had ignored safety for decades. In 1965 Ralph Nader published "Unsafe at Any Speed", a bestselling book that exposed and excoriated the industry's lax attitude. The following year the government came down hard with rules on seat belts, headrests and the like. Now imagine the clamour for legislation after the first child fatality involving self-driving cars.

Fortunately, the small but growing market in cyber-security insurance offers a way to protect consumers while preserving the computing industry's ability to innovate. A firm whose products do not work properly, or are repeatedly hacked, will find its premiums rising, prodding it to solve the problem. A firm that takes reasonable steps to make things safe, but which is compromised nevertheless, will have recourse to an insurance payout that will stop it from going bankrupt. It is here that some carve-outs from liability could perhaps be negotiated. Once again, there are precedents: when excessive claims against American light-aircraft firms threatened to bankrupt the industry in the 1980s, the government changed the law, limiting their liability for old products.

One reason computer security is so bad today is that few people were taking it seriously yesterday. When the internet was new, that was forgivable. Now that the consequences are known, and the risks posed by bugs and hacking are large and growing, there is no excuse for repeating the mistake. But changing attitudes and behaviour will require economic tools, not just technical ones. ◼

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For the love of pizza   *The Economist*   (June 4, 2016)

1. According to the author what are the reasons for Italy's economic woes? Does he adopt a sympathetic attitude to Italy?

2. Explain the following words or phrases (underlined in the text) in the context of the article:

(i) ... gastronomic thermometer of the market

(ii) ... dismayed at its bastardization

(iii) ... have every right to brand their dish

(iv) ... the sacralisation of heritage

3. Briefly discuss only ONE of the following:

(i) The article is very critical of Italy. Do you agree with it or do you think it is unfair? How would you respond to it?

(ii) The EU is portrayed as being very dogmatic and rigid. How do you see the EU's role and function today? What should the EU's objectives be and how should it work towards them?

(iii) The cultural heritage of Italy is immense. What is the importance of cultural heritage for a country and its economy? Do you think Italy takes full advantage of its cultural resources? If not, what do you think it could or should do?

Charlemagne | For the love of pizza

Italy's pride in "genuine" food reveals much about its economic woes

CALL it pizza, pitta or fougasse: when Europe's holidaymakers head for the Mediterranean this summer, they will feast on some type of flatbread with condiments. Such dishes have age-old roots. In the "Aeneid", Virgil's heroes forage for a meal of forest fruit laid on pieces of hard bread on the grass. Famished, they eat the bread, too: "See, we devour the plates on which we fed."

Of all these edible platters, it is pizza that has become the world's favourite fast food, plain dough onto which each country bakes its own flavours: mussels in the Netherlands, Teriyaki chicken and seaweed in Japan. Born in Naples, the modern pizza was the poor man's meal. One 19th-century American visitor, Samuel Morse (inventor of the telegraph), thought it "like a piece of bread that had been taken reeking out of the sewer". For Alexandre Dumas, it was "the gastronomic thermometer of the market": if fish pizza was cheap, there had been a good catch; if oil pizza was dear, there had been a bad olive harvest.

These days pizza is a gastronomic mirror, reflecting Italy's anxiety about globalisation. Italians are rightly proud of their food, yet dismayed at its bastardisation by the rest of the world. They fear that the best in Italian *civiltà* is being looted by others. It is America, not Italy, that has turned everything from pizza to cappuccino into profitable global franchises; Domino's and Starbucks are even trying to penetrate Italy.

Now Naples is fighting to reclaim "real" pizza. Last month hundreds of red-capped *pizzaioli* gathered to bake the world's longest pizza, 1,853.88 metres of it, snaking along the waterfront with the city's fabled vistas of Mount Vesuvius and Capri. It was all in support of Italy's bid to have the art of Neapolitan pizza recognised by UNESCO as a treasure in the world's "intangible cultural heritage", alongside Mongolian knuckle-bone shooting and Brazil's *capoeira* dance. A ruling is expected next year.

In 2010 the European Union registered Neapolitan pizza as a Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG) product. It stipulates that certified "Pizza Napoletana TSG" must consist of a base of twice-leavened, hand-shaped dough (no rolling pin), no wider than 35cm. It must be 0.4cm thick at the centre and 1cm-2cm around the rim. It may be garnished in just three ways: with tomatoes and extra-virgin olive oil, or with certified mozzarella from either buffalo's or cow's milk. It must be baked in a wood-fired oven and eaten on the spot, not frozen or vacuum-packed.

This is culinary dogmatism. European food-inspectors surely have better things to do than take a ruler to pizza. The *pizzaioli* say they want only acknowledgment of their tradition. One oft-heard fear is that, Heaven forfend, America might try to gain recognition for its own inferior pizza. Should Hamburg then copyright the hamburger, or Crimea steak tartare? Tellingly, Italy is the most assiduous state in claiming EU "geographical indications" (GI), be they the stringent Protected Designation of Origin (eg, Chianti Classico), the looser Protected Geographical Indication (eg, Cantucci Toscani) or the weakest appellation, TSG. Excluding TSGS, Italy has secured protection for 924 food products, wines and other drinks, more than France (754) or Spain (361).

Chefs and farmers, pizza-makers included, have every right to brand their dish and set their own standards. The state must obviously ensure that food is safe. Governments have an interest, too, in guaranteeing the quality of some premium appellations—Champagne, say. But the profligate use of state-enforced GIS smacks of producers trying to gouge consumers. Italy betrays an innate protectionism: rather than compete on global markets, producers want to enshrine "heritage", ask for Europe's help and maximise the rents they can extract from "quality" products. They complicate trade deals as the EU seeks to stop others from using terms such as "feta". Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, a fellow of OPEN, a new British think-tank, says the value of geographical indications in trade deals is unproven; they are mostly a sop to farm lobbies to compensate for cuts in subsidies.

Above all, the name-craze limits scale, productivity and innovation. Take Roberto Brazzale, whose family has made Parmesan-style "grana" cheese for generations. He shifted part of his work to the Czech Republic where, he argues, the milk is superior and costs are lower. His "Gran Moravia", made by Italian methods and aged in Italy, is indistinguishable from the official "Grana Padano", yet may not be identified as such. The Po valley cannot produce enough milk to satisfy the potential global demand for Italian grana, he argues; and decreeing the use of animal rather than vegetable rennet means official cheesemakers struggle to sell to vegetarians and observant Muslims and Jews.

Slow food, slow economy

At its best Italy's love of tradition makes for idyllic holidays, wonderful wines and delightful Slow Food. Italians like to think that their art, culture and way of life will lift them out of economic torpor. But the sacralisation of heritage is a millstone. Italy has seen almost no productivity growth in more than a decade, in part because its firms remain small: on average they count seven employees, about the size of a family-run pizzeria. Artisan products offer no salvation. Italy has no global food chains to speak of (or even big retailers, such as France's Carrefour). It may be home to espresso, but the next-door Swiss invented Nespresso.

If pizza embodies Italy's woes on a plate, it also offers hope. Look closely at a Neapolitan pizza: the succulent tomatoes came from the New World; the best mozzarella is made from the milk of the buffalo, an Asian beast that may have arrived in Italy with the barbarian tribes who conquered Rome; the aromatic basil originates from India. Neapolitan migrants carried pizza across Italy and America. The genius of Italy lies in its inventiveness and adaptability—not in a hallowed land, nor in an imagined tradition canonised by the state. That way lies paralysis and cultural fossilisation. ∎